We propose a jam-then-harvest protocol for dual-hop cooperative networks with an untrusted relay, where an external friendly jammer helps keep information secret from the untrusted relay by transmitting a priori jamming signal for the destination. In particular, the wireless powered jammer scavenges energy from the received forwarded signal and recovers its initial energy to perform jamming in next time slot. We analytically derive an exact expression of the probability of nonzero secrecy rate (PNSR) for the proposed jam-then-harvest protocol. For performance comparison, cooperative jamming with the constant power supply is provided as a lower bound benchmark. Our results show that the proposed protocol not only can achieve the secure communication but also can harvest the enough energy without a loss of performance in the low jamming power region.
Introduction
With the wide deployment of cellular mobile network and Internet as well as the emergence and development of various wireless networks, wireless communications have become an integral part in our daily life for enabling ubiquitous access and different service demand. However, due to the openness and shared nature of the wireless channel, the security of information transmission is a critical issue for wireless networks. Traditionally, the secrecy is guaranteed mostly relying on the cryptographic techniques and protocols at the upper layers of wireless networks [1] . One main drawback of these existing techniques is their heavy dependence on a complex mathematics computation in the secret key generation and distribution and management, which is impractical for wireless networks due to resource constraints and the lack of the infrastructure support. Recently, cooperation-based physical layer security has emerged as an attractive solution to improve the secrecy of low-power single-antenna wireless systems [2, 3] . In addition, node cooperation is also beneficial to enhance the spectral efficiency and power utilization.
One of the most common cooperative schemes in physical layer security is cooperative jamming (CJ) (see [4] [5] [6] and the references therein), where external friendly jammers are employed to collaboratively transmit interfering signals when source is transmitting, so as to degrade the wiretap channel for greatly enhancing the secrecy rate. However, additional energy consumption to transmit jamming signals at the helpers brings about the following two major challenges. First, low-power jammers with limited battery supplies would likely prefer saving energy for their own communication to aiding the others; thus, the benefits of CJ would be quite compromised. Second, the energy imbalance among users may lead to the creation of energy holes and even shorten the network lifetime.
Recently, radiofrequency-(RF-) enabled wireless energy harvesting (WEH) has attracted an upsurge of interest due to its great potential to provide the power supply in a cost-effective and reliable way for energyconstrained wireless nodes and networks [7, 8] . In fact, WEH potentially offers new opportunities to replenish the extra energy requirements at the jammers to overcome the critical challenges above. In [9, 10] , a wireless powered jammer was employed to enable secure direct communication between source and destination in the presence of an eavesdropper and yet not to add extra power cost. As to the relay systems, a harvest-and-jam protocol was presented where multiantenna jammers were powered by the source to secure two-hop networks in [11] . While in [12] , by using a set of single-antenna WEH-enabled self-sustaining AF relays/jammers, a mixed cooperative beamforming-CJ approach was proposed to improve security. In [13] , the best wireless powered relay/jammer with a random jammer/relay selection schemes was investigated for two-hop relay networks. While in [14] , the power allocation is optimized to maximize the secrecy sum rate of a decode-and-forward two-way relay network by using arti cial noise and WEHenabled jammers. In these models, relays are assumed to be trusted; however, from a robust perspective, the relay could be a potential eavesdropper. For example, all users of practical applications in defence and nancial networks do not have the same rights to access the information [15] . With the constant power supply, in [16, 17] , the secure transmission schemes were presented to hinder the untrusted relay from deciphering the source messages. By using energy harvesting, in [18] , the secrecy performance of two-hop networks via a WEH-enabled untrusted relay was investigated, where the destinationassisted jamming signal helps confuse the untrusted relay as well as acts as a potential energy source. To the best of our knowledge, for the untrusted relay system, how to enable two-hop secure communication by using a WEHenabled jammer has not been addressed in the literature.
Motivated by reaping the bene ts from WEH and pressing demands for secure communication in untrusted relay networks, in this paper, we focus on a wireless powered jammer-assisted secure dual-hop cooperative communication. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(i) We propose a newly designed jam-then-harvest (JH) protocol to enable secure communication for dual-hop cooperative networks with an untrusted relay. (ii) We theoretically discuss the secrecy performance of the proposed JH and then derive an exact analytical expression for its probability of nonzero secrecy rate (PNSR). (iii) e conventional cooperative jamming (CJ) scheme with the constant power supply is provided as a lower bound benchmark. We show that the proposed JH can achieve a similar secrecy performance as CJ in the low initial jamming power region.
System Model and Secure Protocol
As depicted in Figure 1 , we consider a cooperative dual-hop relay system where the source S tries to transfer information to the destination D located out of its communication range via one untrusted relay R. To help keep information secret from R, a friendly jammer J is employed to jam the untrusted relay; however, J is an energy-constrained node only with the initial power P J but without conventional energy supply. A simple RF circuit for harvesting energy is equipped at J to harvest energy from external RF signals. e harvested energy is assumed able to recharge the jammer's battery with in nite capacity. All nodes only have one omnidirectional antenna operating in a half-duplex mode. e complex channel coe cient between nodes i (i ∈ R, J, D) and j (j ∈ S, R, J, i ≠ j) is denoted by h ij , which is modeled as a zero-mean, independent, circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with a variance Λ ij d −φ ij , where d ij in meters (m) is the Euclidean distance between nodes i and j and φ is the path loss exponent. Additionally, the noise at all nodes is assumed to be additive white Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ 2 .
Since the direct link between S and D is not available, a jam-then-harvest protocol based on two time slots of equal length is adopted, as shown in Figure 2 . Without loss of generality, each transmit time slot is normalized to be 1 so that at each time slot the numerical values of energy are identical to power. e jam-then-harvest protocol consists of two parts: (1) transmitting and jamming phase: in the rst time slot, S broadcasts information signal to the untrusted relay R, while J simultaneously emits a unit-power jamming signal z to create interference at R; (2) relay and energyharvesting phase: during the second time slot, after amplifying the received mixture signals from S and J, R forwards the resulting signal to D with the transmit power P. Meanwhile, J is capable of harvesting energy from the signals sent by R to store and recover the initial energy P J .
In phase 1, to protect information from being eavesdropped by untrusted R, the friendly jammer J performs jamming while S transmits unit-power signal x, so the received superposition signal at R can be expressed as follows:
where P denotes the transmit power by S and n r represents the narrow-band Gaussian noise at R. en during phase 2, R broadcasts the mixture signals based on the amplify-andforward protocol to D, as such the received signal at D and J can be, respectively, written as where β is the power normalization factor given by
e signal-to-interference-plusnoise ratio (SINR) at D and R to decode x is thus, respectively, given by
where c P/σ 2 and c J P J /σ 2 . Note that we assume the jamming signal z is a priori known to D, which will just hurt the untrusted relay's listening but not cause any harm to the destinations; therefore, the jamming signal has been perfectly cancelled in c d . To perfectly eliminate the jamming signals at D, such signals should be con dently shared between J and D before jamming. is can be practically implemented as in [19] . First, the same pseudorandom generators with nite states and seed tables are pre-stored at both J and D (but not available at R). Next, before each transmission phase, one seed is randomly chosen from the seed table and the index of this seed is shared between J and D. In particular, the seed index can be shared by using the two-step phase-shift modulationbased method [19] . Accordingly with (3), the achievable rate at the destination D and R in bits/sec/Hertz (bps/Hz) can be, respectively, given by
From (3) and (4), we can see that both R d and R r are increasing function of c but decreasing function of c J . However, if R r increases (decreases) slower than R d as c (c J ) increases, the di erence between R d and R r may increase.
On the other hand, from (2), the harvested energy at the jammer J can be calculated as
where η denotes the energy-harvesting e ciency of the jammer. Similarly, it can be observed from (5) that the harvested energy E also increases with c or c J .
Secrecy Performance
e friendly external jammer helps prevent source condential information leakage to the untrusted relay and achieve the secure communication; thus, the probability of achieving strictly nonzero secrecy rate is an important performance metric to evaluate the system secrecy performance. In this section, we analyze the PNSR of the proposed jam-then-harvest scheme (denoted as "JH"). Additionally, for performance comparison, the secrecy performance for conventional cooperative jamming relying on the constant power supply (denoted as "CJ") is provided as a lower bound benchmark.
JH Scheme.
For the proposed jam-then-harvest scheme, the amount of scavenged energy must satisfy the lowest requirement, i.e., P J . If the harvested energy E is less than the given threshold P J , the power received by the jammer is not su cient to transmit the jamming signal in next time slot, and thus the power outage occurs. Meanwhile, it can be easily obtained from (3) that when c J 0, c r is greater than c d with probability 1, which means a secrecy outage will occur with probability 1 when the power outage happens. If the power received by the friendly jammer J is not smaller than the given initial threshold P J , the secure outage occurs when the achievable rate R d is not more than R r . us, the overall achieved PNSR P out can be formulated as follows:
where P(·) denotes the probability. Substituting c d , c r from (3) and E from (5) and after simpli cation, (6) can be rewritten as
where Z 1 is the root greater than μ/η of the equation Mobile Information Systems distributed random variables with mean Λ ij . Further, we can express P out in (7) analytically as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. e achieved PSNR for the jam-then-harvest scheme is given by
with
Proof. See Appendix A.
In contrast, for the conventional cooperative jamming scheme without employing wireless powered technique, the friendly jammer has a constant power supply. e secrecy outage event occurs only when the achievable rate R d is not more than R r ; thus, the PNSR P out1 can be expressed as
Proposition 2. An analytical expression for the achieved PNSR for "CJ" scheme can be given by
where K n (·) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind with order n defined in [20] .
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Numerical Results
In this section, the PNSR of the proposed "JH" scheme given by (8) is compared with that of the conventional "CJ" scheme in (11) . e simulation parameters are set up as follows: the noise variance σ 2 � −110 dBm; average signal power attenuation ρ 0 at a reference distance d 0 � 1 m is 80 dB; the path loss factor φ � 3; S, R, and D are lying on one straight line and the distance between S and D, d sd , is 200 m. Besides, we assume that the distance from J to R is 1 m.
First, we set the location of R as the midpoint of the line segment from S to D. Figure 3 demonstrates the analytical results for the PNSR versus the different transmit power P and the initial jamming power P J . It can be seen that the proposed "JH" scheme achieves a similar secrecy performance as "CJ" scheme in the low initial jamming power P J region. However, in the high P J region, the PNSR remains almost unchanged for "CJ" while increases for "JH" similar to the power outage probability (POP). is is because as P J increases, the PNSR for "JH" is dominated by the power outage. e higher the P J is set, the more it becomes difficult to replenish the initial power. In addition, the PNSR is observed to decrease as the transmit power P increases for both schemes. Figure 4 further shows that analytical results are in excellent agreement with simulation results as P � 38 dBm or P J � −8 dBm. It can also be observed that the proposed JH scheme can achieve the secure communication without a loss of performance in the low jamming power region.
Next, the coordinate of R is set to move from (15, 0) m to (145, 0) m. Figure 5 plots the PNSR versus the distance (d sr ) between S and R. It is observed that the PNSR for both schemes decreases as R moves close to D.
is is because the closer the R is to D, the smaller the achievable rate R r at R is, while the rate R d at D will increase. It is worth noting that as expected for "JH," the PNSR is not less than the power outage probability.
Conclusion
In this paper, the secrecy performance of the cooperative dual-hop network via an untrusted relay is investigated. Specifically, we first propose a jam-then-harvest protocol for the cooperative dual-hop relay system with the help of an Mobile Information Systems external friendly WEH-enabled jammer. en, we derive the explicit expression for the probability of nonzero secrecy rate (PNSR). Numerical results show that the exact expression for the PNSR is matched well with the simulation results. It can also be observed from the numerical results in the low initial jamming power region that the proposed protocol is capable of achieving the secure communication but also replenishing the initial jamming energy without a loss of performance.
Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the probability P(Y ≤ −μZ + ((μσ 2 )/ (ηZP − P J ))) as follows:
Similarly, we can also obtain the probability P(E ≥ P J ∩ c d ≤ c r ) in (7) as follows:
Now, we can easily obtain
(A.5)
Let us denote the second term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (A.5) and the first and second terms on the RHS of (A.6) as Q 3 , Q 4 , and Q 5 respectively, then after some algebraic manipulation, we obtain
Mobile Information Systems where A � (1/(Λ dr cc J z)) + (1/(Λ dr c)) and B � (Λ dr z)/ (Λ dr z + Λ rs /c J ), thus yielding the proposition.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
According to (10), we have
Now, we have
4Λ re (yc + 1) Λ dr cc J K 1 4(yc + 1) Λ dr Λ re cc J dy.
(B.3)
So, we get Proposition 2.
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